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Policy Research Working Paper 4993
The Egyptian Social Fund for Development was 
established in 1991 with a mandate to reduce poverty. 
Since its inception, it has disbursed about $2.5 billion, 
of which nearly two-fifths was devoted to supporting 
microcredit and financing community development 
and infrastructure. This paper investigates the size of the 
impact of the Fund’s interventions, whether the benefits 
have been commensurate with the costs, and whether 
the programs have been targeted successfully to the poor. 
The core of the impact evaluation applies propensity-
score matching to data from the 2004/2005 national 
Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption 
Survey.
  The authors find that Egypt’s Social Fund for 
Development programs have had clear and measurable 
effects, in the expected direction, for all of the programs 
considered: educational interventions have reduced 
This paper—a product of the a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research 
Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the cost-effectiveness of rural development interventions 
such as social fund of Egypt. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at skhandker@worldbank.org.  
illiteracy, health and potable water programs have lowered 
household spending on health, sanitation interventions 
have cut household spending on sanitation and lowered 
poverty, and road projects have reduced household 
transportation costs by 20 percent. Microcredit is 
associated with higher household expenditures in 
metropolitan areas and urban Upper Egypt, but not 
elsewhere.
  The Social Fund for Development’s road projects 
generate benefits that, by some estimates, exceed the 
costs, as do health and potable water interventions; this is 
less evident for interventions in education and sanitation. 
The Fund argues that its mission is primarily social, and 
so should not be judged using a cost-benefit analysis. The 
Fund support for microcredit is strongly pro-poor; the 
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Introduction 
 
Social funds have been defined as “agencies that finance small projects in several sectors targeted to 
benefit a country’s poor and vulnerable groups based on a participatory manner of demand” (Jorgensen 
and Van Domelen 1999).  After the first social fund was set up in Bolivia in 1987, the idea attracted 
immediate support, and by May 2001 the World Bank had provided financing to more than 98 social 
funds in 58 countries. 
 
This is the context in which the Egyptian Social Fund for Development (SFD) was established in 1991, 
when the government sought to widen the social safety net in the wake of an economic reform and social 
adjustment program.  Run by a semi-autonomous agency that reports to the office of the Prime Minister, 
the SFD is one of the three main safety net programs in Egypt, along with the system of subsidies of basic 
foodstuffs, and the Ministry of Social Solidarity’s cash transfer program. 
 
The mandate of the SFD is to (i) reduce poverty by supporting community-level initiatives, (ii) increase 
employment opportunities, and (iii) encourage small-enterprise development.  In doing this, it is tasked 
with mobilizing national and international resources, and cooperating with governmental bodies, NGOs, 
and community and private sector groups.  Since its inception, the SFD had disbursed a total of LE 11.4 
billion  as of the end of the first quarter of 2008, equivalent to approximately US$2.5 billion; this 
represents about US$2.36 per person per year2
                                                 
2 Source for population information: UN World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. 
, or about 0.15 percent of GDP. An estimated 32% of 
Egyptians are potential beneficiaries from SFD projects, in the sense that they live in villages or wards 
where there is at least one SFD intervention. 
 
Of its total spending, the SFD devoted 62 percent to supporting the development of small enterprises, 9 
percent to microcredit, and the remaining 28 percent to financing community infrastructure.  The SFD 
acts as a source of funding for projects, which are implemented by other agencies. 
 
The focus of this paper is on SFD’s activities in community infrastructure and microcredit.  Broadly, the 
question of interest is whether the SFD has had an impact on living standards.  More specifically, our 
purpose is to measure the effects of SFD interventions on the immediate outputs (such as the number of 
households connected to sewers), on the short-term direct outcomes (for instance, the under-five mortality 
rate), and on the long-term impact on poverty, illiteracy, and employment.  Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 3 of 36 
 
We also address a number of other interesting issues, such as whether SFD interventions are well targeted 
to the poor – a subject explored in more detail in ESFD (2006) – or cost effective (see Rawlings et al. 
2004, p.v), and whether the benefits of SFD interventions exceed the costs. The cost-benefit analysis 
should not, however, be viewed as an evaluation of the SFD, which was tasked with pursuing a number of 
social objectives rather than ensuring that benefits exceeded costs. 
 
The usual justification for undertaking an impact evaluation applies here: as a matter of public policy we 
would like to know how effective the SFD has been, and hence if its efforts should be expanded or 
reduced, or its programs reoriented or redesigned. There is a dearth of such evaluations; a recent multi-
donor review mission wrote that “SFD needs to … above all – deepen its attention to practical policy 
analysis and impact assessment.”   
 
In what follows we first set out the essential features of the SFD’s activities in microcredit and 
community infrastructure  (comprising public works, and community development), outline the 
methodology used to measure the impact of these programs, discuss the viability of the data, present the 
results, weigh the costs against the benefits of SFD programs, and evaluate the extent to which the 
interventions were targeted to the poor. 
 
The Social Fund for Development 
 
The main programs of the SFD are set out in Table 1.  In this paper we seek to measure the impact of 
interventions in education, health, potable water, sanitation, road maintenance, and microcredit.  
Collectively these represent disbursements of LE 3 billion over the period 1991 – 2007, or just over a 
quarter of all SFD spending.  The remaining spending was either on minor programs or administration, or 
went to the Small Enterprise Development Organization, which we are not in a position to evaluate. 
 
The  Community Development Program  is intended to promote projects that alleviate poverty.  It is 
targeted geographically to relatively poor parts of the country, where it funds literacy classes, supports 
primary health care through the renovation of health units and training, and finances small environmental 
projects, including the digging of latrines, garbage collection, and tree planting.   
 
In targeting poor areas, the SFD uses its network of 27 regional offices, which help identify local needs, 
mobilize community participation, and monitor the progress of projects.  The Community Development Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 4 of 36 
Program activities work with long-established partners that include the Ministry of Health and 
Population, and the General Authority for Literacy and Adult Education. 
 
The Public Works Program has provided substantial funding for the extension of public potable water 
networks, sewage treatment and connections, and the construction and maintenance of paved roads.  It 
also finances the restoration and construction of some public buildings such as health units and youth 
centers, and environmental projects that include covering watercourses, stabilizing river banks, and 
collecting garbage.  This program works closely with existing government units  both for project 
identification and implementation, although much of the actual work on the projects is done by local 
private contractors. 
 




Main activity / 
Disbursements, 
1991-2007 
Activities, 1991 – 2007 






LE 390 million 
Renovated health units (840) 
Health awareness campaigns 
Training of health personnel 
Yes 
  Education  
LE 200 million 
Illiteracy classes (1.5 million people enrolled) 
Single classroom schools 
Community schools 
Training of teachers for literacy classes 
Yes 
  Other 
LE 210 million 
Public buildings (rehabilitation; youth and community 
centers) 
Environment (covering waterways, weeding, river bank 
protection) 
No 
Public Works  Potable Water 
LE 620 million 
Public networks (8,480 km) 
Ground tanks (375) 
Artesian wells (440) 
Shelter houses (200) 
Yes 
  Sanitation 
LE 220 million 
Public networks (459) 
Treatment plants (16) 
Pumping stations (38) 
House connections (19,500) 
Yes 
  Roads 
LE 500 million 
Construction and maintenance of rural roads (2,500 km)  Yes 
  Other 
LE 660 million  
NGO capacity building 
Environment (latrines, garbage collection, draining, pest 
spraying, tree planting) 
Training 
No 
Microcredit  LE 1,062 
million 





Support for small enterprises, including loans and technical 
support. 
No 
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The micro-credit program seeks to encourage the supply of loans to low-income households.  It provides 
working capital to some financial intermediaries, such as Community Development Associations, 
Productive Family Associations, and the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit; in 
other cases it gives grants to financial institutions, on condition that they commit to more microlending. 
 
The government has been increasing the pressure on the SFD to operate in a way that is financially self-
sustaining – for instance, by charging fees, or putting more emphasis on microlending at appropriate 
interest rates.  It recently refused a loan from the World Bank that would have provided funds to the SFD, 
because it was concerned that the return on the spending would not be sufficient to justify the cost of 
repaying the loan.  On the other hand, the government might be more inclined to help the SFD obtain 
such funding if it found that SFD projects have a strong impact, which returns us again to the importance 




In seeking to measure the impact of SFD programs, we first need to clarify what impacts need to be 
measured, and then set out an appropriate methodology whereby these impacts may be identified and 
quantified. 
 
There are two broad types of program effect that are of interest to us: short-term outcomes, and long-term 
impacts.  The variables that we use to measure these effects are set out in more detail in Table 2, for each 
of the six sectors of interest.  So, for instance, in evaluating projects under the education program, we 
might be interested in the proportion of participants in literacy classes who obtained diplomas (an 
outcome), and the effect on the illiteracy rate or employment rate (impacts). 
 
We would like to think that SFD interventions would have unambiguously positive effects: more 
education would reduce the illiteracy rate; health projects should reduce mortality rates and poverty, as 
should more potable water and improved sanitation; better roads, and more microcredit, should increase 
incomes and lower poverty.   
 
However, experience from other evaluations of social funds suggests that improvements such as these 
cannot be taken for granted.  For instance, Rawlings et al. (2004), in a comparative study of social funds 
in six countries, found that while interventions led to greater access to and use of basic services, tangible 
improvements in welfare were sometimes elusive.  For instance, educational projects did not raise test Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 6 of 36 
scores or primary school enrollment rates in rural Bolivia, although they did raise enrollment rates in 
Nicaragua and Zambia.  Similarly, spending on primary health centers reduced infant mortality in Bolivia, 
but had small or no discernible effects on health outcomes in other countries.  And sanitation projects led 
to health gains in Peru and Bolivia but not in Honduras.   
 
Table 2.  Measures of Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, and Impacts 




Education  Money 
# of individuals trained to teach 
# of class rooms established 
# of beneficiaries 
# of nursery classes 
# (percentage) of the 





Health  Renovation of health clinics 
# of health personal trained 
# of health awareness campaigns 
# of beneficiaries 
# of health clinics renovated 
as percentage of total 
health clinics 
# of mothers that received 
pre-natal care 
Rate of immunization 
Under 5 mortality rate 
Average expenditure on 
medicine 
 
Potable water  Length of pipe lines constructed / 
rehabilitated 
# of elevated or ground tanks 
# of household connected as 
a % of total of household 
in the community 
Expenditure on water 
procurement 
# under 5 mortality rate 
Incidence of diarrhea 
Incidence of illnesses due to 
water related disease 




Length of sewerage network 
# of waste water treatment plant 
# of household connected 





Expenditure on health 
 




Mode of transport 
Travel time to reach 
clinic/school 
Employment 
Farm income/ non farm 
income 
Under 5 mortality 
School enrolment rate 
 
Microcredit  # of NGOs receiving loans from 
the SFD 
Amount of money received from 
the SFD 
Average amount loans 
extended (received) by 
SFD NGOs 
# of beneficiaries receiving 
loans 








Where projects have no discernible overall impact, the explanation is typically that the money was poorly 
spent (e.g. on a shiny new school to replace an adequate older building, or on a road to nowhere), or 
crowded out existing services (e.g. a new health center might change where one goes for care, but may 
not raise the level of care appreciably). 
 
The simplest approach to measuring the effects of a program is to compare the outcomes for those who 
were covered by the program with those who were not.  Unfortunately, this does not work, because of the 
problem of endogenous program placement.  For example, the rate of gastroenteritis is 6.9% in villages 
with an SFD health program but just 2.7% for communities without one; yet it would not be credible to 
claim that an SFD health program actually causes more gastroenteritis. Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 7 of 36 
 
The difficulty is that the SFD has, for some of its programs, targeted poorer areas, where many of the 
outcomes of interest (literacy rates, mortality rates, poverty rates, expenditure levels) are inherently 
worse.  This also shows up in Table 3, which shows expenditure levels and poverty rates for villages with 
and without the program interventions of interest.  Thus we see that household expenditure per capita 
levels are lower in localities with an SFD program; and the poverty rate is 30% in villages where the SFD 
had a program to provide potable water, compared with a poverty rate of 18% elsewhere in Egypt. 
 
Table 3.  Poverty Rates and Expenditure Levels for Areas With, and Without, SFD Programs 
  Without any SFD 
program 
With at least one 
SFD program 
All 
Per capita annual expenditure  2,680  2,292  2,556 
Per capita annual food expenditure  1,165  1,076  1,127 
Headcount poverty rate (%):       
  Overall  18.6  21.6  19.6 
  If there was an SFD intervention in       
     Education  19.8  15.0  19.6 
     Health  19.5  22.1  19.6 
     Microcredit  18.8  23.1  19.6 
     Paving roads  19.5  21.8  19.6 
     Potable water  18.2  30.2  19.6 
     Waste water  19.6  12.8  19.6 
  Ranked by expenditure per capita 
  Poorest 40%  Middle 40%  Top 20% 
% having any SFD intervention        
   Urban  10.8  10.4  7.6 
   Rural  9.9  9.9  10.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem of endogenous program placement.  In most of 
what follows we use propensity score matching, but we check the robustness of our results using a 
common impact model. Some further explanation of these approaches is in order. 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
Even if the placement of SFD programs (“treatments”) has not been done randomly, it may be possible to 
measure the impact of the program by using matched comparisons. The idea is to match each participant, 
in this case a village, with an otherwise identical non-participant (the comparator) – based on observed 
pre-treatment or exogenous characteristics – and then to measure the average difference in the outcome 
variable between them. 
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Units that cannot be matched are discarded – this is central to good matching – because they “cannot 
support causal inferences about missing potential outcomes” (Diamond 2005, p.9). The hope is that this 
allows one to mimic the effects of randomization.  Of course, the resulting measure of impact is only 
compelling to the extent that one believes that the matching has been done well and the treatment 
assignment is ignorable; in other words, we know that the treatment was not assigned randomly, but we 
believe that we may proceed  as if it were.  
 
To match treatment with non-treatment units it is helpful to create a summary measure of similarity in the 
form of a propensity score. Let p(Xi) be the probability that unit i be assigned to the treatment group, 
conditional on Xi, and define  
). | ( ) | 1 Pr( ) ( i i i i i X T E X T X p = = ≡   (1) 
This probability of participation – the propensity score – can be estimated using an assignment model. 
Given survey and census information,  we first pool the two samples (i.e. the participants and non-
participants) and estimate a probit model of program participation as a function of pre-treatment and 
exogenous variables that might influence participation.  
 
The computation of propensity scores is only the first step in the process.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
prove that treatment cases may be matched with comparison cases using just the propensity score rather 
than the entire set of pre-determined covariates Xi. In other words, to find the non-participant that is most 
closely matched to the participant, one only needs to find the non-participants with the propensity scores 
closest to that of the participant.  They also show that 
], 1 | | [ ) ( , 1 ) ( = = = i X p T i X p
TT T G E G   (2) 
where  ) ( , 1 | x p T i G = is the difference between the treatment outcome 
T
i Y for treated unit i and the (control) 
outcome for the non-treated unit closest in propensity score to i.  In other words, the average treatment 
effect (the gain for the treated, here denoted by G
TT) may be obtained by computing the expected value of 
the difference in the outcome variable between each treated household and the perfectly matched 
comparison household as matched using the propensity score.  
 


























where Yi is the observed outcome for the ith individual who is treated and Ji is the set of comparators for i, 
and N is the set of units for which the set of comparators is non-empty (the “common support”, discussed Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 9 of 36 
in more detail below). With nearest neighbor matching one chooses the m closest comparators; we follow 
the common practice of using m=1.  As a robustness check, we also use kernel matching, which puts more 
weight on closer comparators than those that are more distant. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) argue that the 
choice of matching mechanism is not as crucial as the proper estimation of the propensity scores, but this 
is not a settled issue. 
  
In practice, the plausibility of propensity score matching depends on ensuring “common support” and 
“balancing.”   
 
Only in the area of common support is it possible to make comparisons that allow us to make inferences 
about causality (Rubin and Waterman 2006), so our comparisons need to be confined to this area, and an 
impact evaluation is not possible unless there is an area of common support (Imbens 2004, p.7). The area 
of common support occurs where the densities of the estimated propensity scores for participants and for 
non-participants overlap, as shown in Fig. 1.  Above point B there are no comparators for borrowers, so 
matching is not possible in this zone; below point A there are no borrowers that need to be matched.  In 






0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1  
Fig. 1. Illustrating the Region of Common Support.  
 
In addition, for propensity score matching to work, the treatment and comparison groups need to be 
“balanced.”  A treated unit and matched comparator might both have essentially the same propensity 
scores, but this does not guarantee that they are similar in a relevant way: one village might be well 






Region of common support 
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It is not necessary for every individual match to be close, but it is important for the distributions of 
covariates for the treated and the comparators to be similar, and this is what is meant by balance. More 
formally, in order to verify balance we need to check whether 
) 0 | ( ˆ ) 1 | ( ˆ = = = T X p T X p   (4) 
where  p ˆ  gives the empirical (rather than population) density of the data. 
 
In line with common practice, the algorithm we use is to estimate a propensity score, match treated with 
non-treated units, and check for balance; if balance is not achieved, we revise the assignment model, and 
repeat this process until (hopefully) balance is achieved.  In checking for balance, we divide the data into 
strata, based on the estimated propensity score, and then use a series of t-tests or chi-square tests to check 
that, within each stratum, the values of each covariate (age, literacy rates, and so on) are on average the 





There is another way to deal with the problem of endogenous program placement.  It may be possible to 
assume that SFD programs have been assigned randomly, conditional on some observable variables, X, 
that might include measures such as village size, or literacy rates, or the structure of the local economy. 
This would constitute partial randomization, and is a maintained assumption rather than a testable 
proposition. 
 
If we are willing to accept the conditional exogeneity of program placement, it may be possible to 
estimate the impact of a treatment such as an SFD program using a parametric model with controls. 
Suppose that we may assume  






i ,..., 1 , = + + = ν β α   (5a) 






i ,..., 1 , = + + = ν β α   (5b) 
where the error terms are normally distributed with zero means and constant variances, and the 
superscripts refer to the treatment group (T) and the comparison group (C).  These two equations are often 
estimated together in the form of a switching regression using the pooled data from both the treatment and 
comparison samples, giving 
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i i i T ν ν ν ε + − =  If we 
may assume that the error term (the “latent effects”) has zero mean conditional on the X covariates and 
treatment  –  a reasonable assumption if there is even partial randomization –  then we have  




i ν ν   and we can get consistent estimates of the average treatment 




C T ATE X E G β β α α − + − =   (7) 
If we are also willing to assume (more problematically) that β
T=β
C then we obtain the common-impact 
model,where the average treatment effect reduces to  .
C T α α −  
 
In what we report below we mainly emphasize the results of propensity score matching, but we include 
the results of the common-impact model both as a robustness check, and as legitimate estimates in their 
own right. 
 
Choosing a Counterfactual 
 
In all impact evaluations one is trying to compare the actual impact with a counterfactual, where the latter 
represents our view of what would have happened in the absence of the project.  In the case of SFD 
projects, a number of possible comparisons are possible, because of the presence of non-SFD 
interventions by ministries and NGOs.  The situation is illustrated in Figure 2, and suggests the following 
useful comparisons:  
 
(i)  A vs. B.  Any given village either has an SFD intervention or it does not.  This comparison of A 
vs. B provides one possible baseline.  The implicit assumption here is that in the absence of an 
SFD intervention, there is still a substantial probability that there would have been some other 
intervention  –  most villages without an SFD project have an intervention by some other 
organization.  If, in this comparison, SFD villages (A) perform better than non-SFD villages (B), 
then it is largely because the SFD projects are more effective than non-SFD projects.  This is a 
relatively high bar, and probably provides a lower bound to the impact of the SFD.  
 
(ii)  D vs. F.  This compares villages that have  just an SFD project with villages that have no 
interventions at all.  It is the relevant comparison if, in the absence of an SFD project, there would 
have been no other project.  In that sense it measures the pure effect of the SFD.  However, it 
implicitly assumes that, in the absence of an SFD project, there would have be no comparable Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 12 of 36 
project so, for instance, if the SFD had not financed a project to pave the local road, then the road 
would have remained unpaved.  This is an extreme assumption, and is not entirely plausible, 
because other organizations – NGOs, ministries, local self-help groups – might well have stepped 
in if the SFD were not present.  Thus the comparison between D and F may be expected to 
provide an upper bound to the effect of the SFD. 
 
(iii)  C vs. E. In this case the comparison measures the incremental impact of SFD interventions, given 
that there are already other interventions.  If there are synergies between SFD projects and other 
interventions – for instance, an SFD sewerage project might work best if some other entity is 
already at work providing piped water – then this comparison should pick up this effect. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Creating a Counterfactual for SFD interventions 
 
In the results reported below, we measure the impact using all three comparisons.  But before doing this, 




Most SFD programs operate at the level of a village (or sub-village), and this is the level at which the 
analysis is conducted.  Although the basic unit of observation is the village, many of the variables – per 
capita income and expenditure levels, for instance – are based on household-level data.  The main source 
of such data is the 2004/2005 edition of the national Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption 
Is there an SFD intervention? 
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Survey (HIECS), conducted by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 
and which interviewed 47,095 households between July 1, 2004 and June 30, 2005.  The sampling is 
stratified (by governorate), and clustered, with 40 households being interviewed in every sampled village 
or ward (the primary sampling units).  The questionnaire collected basic socioeconomic data, including 
enough information to establish consumption-based measures of poverty. 
 
Three changes were made to the survey to ensure that the data could be used for an impact evaluation.  
First, a module was added to the survey instrument that included questions about SFD activities and 
community organizations and initiatives.  This supplementary module was administered to all of the 
12,000 households surveyed in the fourth quarter of the HIECS survey (i.e. from April-June 2005) – each 
of the four rounds of the survey are nationally representative –  as well as to all 10,000  sampled 
households living in areas with SFD interventions.  This module gathered information on illiteracy and 
health programs, the extent of SFD interventions, and the providers and impact of microcredit. 
 
Second, an additional 3,760 households in 94 primary sampling units (PSUs) were surveyed in areas 
where the SFD was active, in order to ensure enough coverage of areas in which the SFD operated; the 
sampling followed the HIECS protocol, and the questionnaire included the supplementary module, but 
omitted some of the irrelevant parts of the HIECS questionnaire.  The intention was to ensure that strictly 
comparable survey data would be available for at least 80 treatment villages (PSUs) for each of the seven 
sub-sectors (education, health, potable water, wastewater, road maintenance, the environment, and 
microcredit) covered by SFD interventions. 
 
The third modification was that a questionnaire on microcredit was administered to a randomly-selected 
sample drawn from all present borrowers under the SFD program, within PSUs in the HIECS master 
sample.   
 
It should be noted that panel data were not available, so powerful techniques of impact evaluation such as 
double differencing were not feasible. This is a major, if inescapable, limitation of the current study. 
 
The household-level data were supplemented with information from a community survey that was 
integrated with the HIECS survey, and provided information on the availability, accessibility, and quality 
of water and sewerage systems, health posts, and primary schools at the level of individual villages and 
wards (i.e. PSUs).  It also sought to measure perceptions of the SFD interventions, and the extent of 
community participation in the projects.  The community survey was also administered in the 94 areas Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 14 of 36 
covered by the supplemental survey.  At the community level, information was also available from the 
2000 census, and this was an important source of pre-determined variables for use in estimating the 
propensity score equation. 
 
Results 1: The Example of Potable Water 
 
To illustrate the approach that we take to measuring the impacts of SFD programs, we first present in 
some detail the results for potable water projects, comparing villages that have both SFD and other (“non-
SFD”) potable water interventions with villages that only have non-SFD interventions; this is the C vs. E 
comparison, to use our terminology from the previous section.  This allows us to discuss both the 
methodological and practical issues involved  in our estimations.  A complete summary of the results for 
the other SFD programs and comparisons is given in the subsequent section of the paper. 
 
Propensity Score Matching.  The first step here is to estimate a propensity score equation that satisfies 
the balancing property.  Our procedure was to estimate a probit  assignment model, check for balance, and 
then adjust the model until balance was achieved.  The model whose estimates are shown in Table 4 is 
“balanced”, and it is also broadly reasonable: SFD potable water projects were more likely to occur in 
areas where families were larger, the poverty rate higher, and access to sewers was lower.  The region of 
common support stretches from 0.012 to 0.725, which includes all the SFD project areas and 1,044 of the 
1,089 non-SFD areas, and should provide an adequate basis for subsequent matching. 
 
Table 4.  Estimate of Propensity Score Equation, Potable Water Projects, Comparing “Mixed” SFD and 
Other Interventions with Non-SFD Interventions 
  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Dependent variable: =1 if village has SFD piped water project, =0 otherwise     
Households with access to a sewage system in 2004/05 (%)  -0.169  0.013 
Average household size in 2004/05  0.251  0.007 
Female-headed households in 2004/05 (% of all households)  0.577  0.051 
PSU had one or more training programs (yes=1) in 2004/05  -0.304  0.014 
Illiteracy rate in 2004/05 (%)  -0.243  0.007 
Headcount poverty rate in 2000 (%)  0.0015  0.0003 
Female-headed households in 2000 (% of all households)  0.033  0.001 
Intercept  -2.548  0.040 
Notes.  Probit equation; pseudo R
2 = 0.082. Data come from 1,291 PSUs (villages and wards), of which 202 have SFD and other 
interventions, and 1,089 have non-SFD interventions only.  The regression was weighted by population size.  The region of 
common support is [0.012, 0.725] and includes all the PSUs with SFD and other interventions and 1,044 of the PSUs with non-
SFD interventions. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
In Tables 5-7 we present a number of estimates of the effect of SFD interventions on the headcount 
poverty rate, which is one of the long-term impacts of most interest.  The first measure is based on a 
regression equation in which the headcount poverty rate in a village is the dependent variable, and the Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 15 of 36 
presence of an SFD intervention is captured as a binary covariate.  The regression is confined to the 
sample of PSUs (villages and wards) in which there are non-SFD projects to supply potable water, and so 
the measure of impact here should pick up the incremental effect of SFD interventions, given that there 
are already other interventions. 
 
The regression results in Table 5 use only those observations that are in the region of common support, 
and they weight the observations by the inverse of the propensity scores, as suggested by Imbens (2004, 
p.16).  By this measure, the presence of an SFD piped water project reduces the poverty rate by 0.8 
percentage points, an estimate that is significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 5.  Estimates of Regression Showing Impact of SFD projects  on the Headcount Poverty Rate, 
Comparing PSUs Having  “Mixed” SFD and Other Interventions with PSUs Having  only Non-SFD 
Interventions 
  Coefficient  p-value 
Dependent variable: Headcount poverty rate (%)     
SFD piped water project in place (1=yes, 0=no)  -0.81  0.00 
Households with access to a sewage system in 2004/05 (%)  -1.53  0.00 
Average household size in 2004/05  0.26  0.07 
Female-headed households in 2004/05 (% of all households)  1.65  0.08 
PSU had one or more training programs (yes=1) in 2004/05  -0.16  0.64 
Illiteracy rate in 2004/05 (% illiterate among those older than 10)  -0.45  0.01 
Headcount poverty rate in 2000 (%)  0.07  0.00 
Female-headed households in 2000 (% of all households)  0.06  0.02 
Intercept  1.08  0.17 
Notes.  Observations are weighted by the square root of the inverse of the propensity score (if SFD project is in place) or by 
square root of the inverse of 1-propensity score (if SFD project is not in place).  Adjusted R
2 = 0.168. Data come from 1,290 
PSUs (villages and wards) for which data were available and fall within the region of common support (as determined by the 
propensity score equation – see Table 4). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
The results of the propensity score matching are shown in Table 6.  The upper panel uses nearest-
neighbor matching, and also finds that the poverty rate is 0.8 percentage points lower in villages with 
SFD projects than in the comparison villages, although the difference is not quite statistically significant.  
Kernel matching finds that the under-5 mortality rate is about 0.4 percentage points lower in the treatment 
villages, but here again the difference is not quite statistically significant.   
 
Table 7 displays the results of estimating straightforward impact equations.  These use observations from 
the full data set, and not just for villages in the area of common support, and they include a large number 
of other variables (which reduces the sample size somewhat, because some values are missing).  The 
results of the common-impact model – given in the middle columns of Table 7 – show that the presence 
of a SFD piped water project is associated with a 0.5 percentage point reduction in the poverty rate, after 
controlling for other influences, but the result is not statistically significant.  The general-impact model is 
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the presence of the SFD project and these variables; it finds an implausibly large reduction (of 2.2 
percentage points) in the poverty rate. 
 
Table 6.  Results of Propensity Score Matching to Determine the Impact of SFD projects on the Headcount 
Poverty Rate, Comparing PSUs Having “Mixed” SFD and Other Interventions with PSUs Having only Non-
SFD Interventions 
  Number 
of PSUs 
Headcount 
Poverty rate (%) 
Analytical Standard 
Error / (t-statistic) 
Bootstrapped Standard 
Error / (t-statistic) 
Nearest neighbor matching         
  Matched treated cases  202  4.07     
  Matched comparison cases  170  4.83     
  Treated – Comparison    -0.76  0.56 (t=-1.37)  0.53 (t=-1.43) 
Kernel matching         
  Matched treated cases  202  4.08     
  Matched comparison cases  1,044  4.48     
  Treated – Comparison    -0.39  n.a.  0.32 (t=-1.22) 
Notes: Comparisons use propensity score based on equation in Table 4, and confined to the region of common support, where the 
propensity score is between 0.020 and 0.725.  “Treated cases” refers to PSUs where there are both SFD and non-SFD potable 
water projects, and these constitute 16% of all 1,246 PSUs in the region of common support.  “Comparison cases” refers to PSUs 
where there are only non-SFD potable water projects.  Kernel matching uses Epanechnikov kernel functions with a bandwidth of 
0.06.  Bootstrapped results are based on 100 draws. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
A more complete set of estimates of the effects of potable water provision are shown in Table 8; in each 
case, we are comparing villages where there are both SFD and non-SFD water projects with villages 
where there are only non-SFD water projects.  Surprisingly, the presence of an SFD water supply project 
does not appear to increase the number of households that have access to piped water, suggesting that for 
this type of project, the SFD substitutes for, rather than supplements, other potable water projects.  On the 
other hand, when there is an SFD project, households spend less on water than they otherwise would; one 
possibility is that the SFD may not require as much cost recovery as other suppliers of water.  The effects 
of SFD water projects on health are mixed; they appear to reduce spending on health care, and may 
reduce the child mortality rate, but the incidence of illness, especially diarrhea and renal disease but 
perhaps also malaria and bilharzia, actually rises.  This merits further investigation; the presence of 
additional water, if poorly treated or disposed of improperly, could indeed increase the incidence of 
water-borne disease; if this is the case, then the provision of  potable water would need to include 
provisions that deal with water quality and disposal. 
 
Results 2: Summarizing the Impacts of SFD Projects 
 
The measured impacts of SFD projects are summarized in Tables 9-14.  In each case we only present the 
relevant measures of impact, and not the complete (and voluminous) regression and other details.  The 
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Table 7.  Estimates of Impact Equations for SFD Potable Water Projects (In the Presence of Other Potable 
Water Interventions) on the Headcount Poverty Rate 
  Common-impact model  General impact model 
  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Dependent variable: Headcount Poverty Rate (%)         
SFD piped water project in place (1=yes, 0=no)  -0.48  0.13  -19.82  0.04 
Average value of durable goods  -0.65  0.00  -0.60  0.00 
Children as proportion of household members  -3.71  0.20  -5.95  0.06 
Adult males as proportion of household members  -1.36  0.68  -5.48  0.12 
Adult females as proportion of household members  -5.03  0.16  -6.95  0.07 
Proportion of households with access to sewerage (%)  -0.83  0.03  -0.73  0.07 
Average household size  0.33  0.04  0.40  0.03 
Female-headed households (% of households)  1.34  0.18  0.96  0.39 
Proportion of children who are working (%)  -5.56  0.00  -4.89  0.00 
Illiteracy rate (%)  0.89  0.35  0.49  0.65 
Prevailing economic activity in PSU is services (yes=1)  0.97  0.12  0.64  0.32 
PSU has one or more training programs (yes=1)  0.42  0.16  0.45  0.14 
PSU has an illiteracy eradication program (yes=1)  -0.59  0.71  0.03  0.88 
2000: Employment rate (%)  0.13  0.01  0.02  0.01 
2000: Illiteracy rate (%)  -0.03  0.17  -0.03  0.18 
2000: Headcount poverty rate (%)  0.05  0.00  0.06  0.00 
2000: Per capita expenditure  0.001  0.00  0.001  0.02 
2000: Per capita food expenditure  -0.004  0.02  -0.002  0.15 
2000: Female-headed households (% of households)  0.05  0.08  0.01  0.78 
2000: Access to piped water (% of households)  0.002†  0.62  -0.002†  0.64 
2000: Access to sanitation (% of households)  0.002  0.65  0.002  0.67 
Intercept  8.17  0.01  9.72  0.00 
Interaction terms (of variables with presence of SFD piped 
water project): 
No    Yes   
Adjusted R
2  0.25    0.26   
Number of observations (PSUs)  1,267    1,267   
Notes: Treatment effect for interactive equation, averaged over all observations: -2.21.  † Coefficient shown here has been 
multiplied by 10
6. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
Table 8.  Estimates of Effects of SFD Potable Water Interventions (in the Presence of Other Potable Water 
Interventions)   
  Propensity Score Matching Model  Impact Model 








Outputs           
  Households with access to piped water (%)  -0.02  -0.12  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03 
  Average household spending on potable water  -1.02**  -1.92*  -1.39**  -1.21*  -1.57 
Outcomes (short-term)           
  Under-5 mortality rate (per thousand)  -5.94  4.85  -4.07  -5.55  -35.19 
  Prevalence of diarrhea (%)  2.63**  2.93**  2.37**  2.49**  3.43 
  Prevalence of malaria (%)  0.04*  -0.00  0.04  0.04  0.11 
  Prevalence of renal disease (%)  0.42**  0.46**  0.46**  0.54**  0.15 
  Prevalence of bilharzia (schistosomiasis) (%)  0.12*  0.16  0.01  0.14*  -0.16 
  Per capita expenditure on health care  -12.13**  -17.78*  -12.71**  -6.34  22.44 
Impact (long-run)           
  Poverty rate (%)  -0.81**  -0.76  -0.39  -0.48  -2.21 
Notes: * denotes significant at 10% level, ** denotes significant at 5% level.  Significance levels for General Impact Model are 
not shown here. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
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computations begin by estimating a propensity score equation, and then match the treated with the control 
villages (or households, in the case of the microcredit results) in the area of common support.  As 
discussed above, the “Regression” columns report the results of estimating the impact equation in the area 
of common support, weighting the observations with the inverse of the propensity score. 
 
The single largest component of the SFD interventions in education has been the provision of literacy 
classes, which have enrolled almost 1.5 million people.  It may be seen from Table 9 that this has had a 
measurable effect in reducing the proportion of people who are illiterate (by about 0.04; the mean value is 
0.29) and providing literacy certificates (up by about 0.08; the mean value is 0.37).  These results are 
robust, in the sense that they apply to all three comparisons.  However, the efforts have not had any clear 
effect on the employment rate, and they are associated with higher, rather than lower, poverty rates, which 
is unexpected.  One possibility is that SFD educational projects equip people to leave their villages and 
find better jobs elsewhere; this could actually increase the local poverty rate, if this process allows the 
less-poor to leave.   
 
Table 9.  Summary of Effects of SFD Interventions in Education 
  SFD intervention vs. no SFD 
intervention [A vs. B] 
SFD intervention only vs. no 
intervention at all [D vs. F] 
SFD intervention with others vs. 
other interventions only [C vs. E] 
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% who got 
certificate† 


















Impacts:                     
























































Notes: † Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.  
† % of participants who obtained a certificate.  All results are derived by first estimating a propensity score equation, and then 
confining the regression, nearest-neighbor matching, or kernel matching, to the region of common support. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
 
SFD health projects mainly consist of renovating health centers, training personnel, and conducting health 
awareness campaigns.  The clearest and most consistent effect of this spending is that it reduces annual 
spending on health, by about LE 9 per household (the mean spending is LE 51).  There is also a clear and 
strong effect on the under-5 mortality rate, which now stands at 19.9 per thousand, but is reduced by 
about 6 per thousand as a result of SFD interventions.   
 
However, the effect of health interventions on the poverty rate is less clear.  When SFD interventions 
occur in addition to other interventions (the C vs. E comparison), they appear to lower the poverty rate, Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 19 of 36 
but if one compares areas that just have SFD health projects with areas that have no health projects, the 
SFD areas are poorer.  This is not compelling, and suggests that our propensity score matching may not 
be controlling adequately for other influences in these cases.   
 
Table 10.  Summary of Effects of SFD Interventions in Health 
  SFD intervention vs. no SFD 
intervention [A vs. B] 
SFD intervention only vs. no 
intervention at all [D vs. F] 
SFD intervention with others vs. 
other interventions only [C vs. E] 







































































Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.  
All results are derived by first estimating a propensity score equation, and then confining the regression, nearest-neighbor 
matching, or kernel matching, to the region of common support. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
The SFD has spent LE 620 million on providing potable water, including a public network of 8,480 
kilometers.  As Table 11 shows, this has led to sharp drops in spending on water and on health care.  It is 
noteworthy that the reduction in health spending here is twice as large as the reduction associated with 
SFD health projects.  There is also some modest evidence in Table 11 that the provision of potable water 
has led to a lower child mortality rate. 
 
The effects on poverty of providing potable water are more mixed; where SFD projects are in addition to 
other interventions, they help reduce poverty, but not otherwise.   
 
Table 11.  Summary of Effects of SFD Interventions in Potable Water Provision 
  SFD intervention vs. no SFD 
intervention [A vs. B] 
SFD intervention only vs. no 
intervention at all [D vs. F] 
SFD intervention with others vs. 
other interventions only [C vs. E] 



























































































Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.  
All results are derived by first estimating a propensity score equation, and then confining the regression, nearest-neighbor 
matching, or kernel matching, to the region of common support. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
The sanitation projects of the SFD consist mainly of constructing public networks and providing house 
connections.  These activities have had the expected effects – increasing access to sewerage networks, 
halving household spending on sanitation, and lowering the poverty rate.  These effects are especially Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 20 of 36 
clear where SFD projects are undertaken in conjunction with other interventions (comparing C vs. E); 
when SFD-only areas are compared with areas lacking any project, the effects of SFD projects are either 
not statistically significant or counterintuitive (in the case of renal disease).  It is curious that sanitation 
projects are not associated with lower household spending on health; one might have expected better 
sanitation facilities to improve health and so reduce such spending.  Better health might then be 
associated with higher productivity and incomes, and a lower poverty rate.  
 
Table 12.  Summary of Effects of SFD Interventions in Sanitation 
  SFD intervention vs. no SFD 
intervention [A vs. B] 
SFD intervention only vs. no 
intervention at all [D vs. F] 
SFD intervention with others vs. 
other interventions only [C vs. E] 



































































































































Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.  
All results are derived by first estimating a propensity score equation, and then confining the regression, nearest-neighbor 
matching, or kernel matching, to the region of common support. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
Over the period 1991-2007, the SFD spent over LE 500 million on building and maintaining rural roads.  
As expected, these projects were associated with substantial reductions in household spending on 
transportation, by about LE 13 (compared to a mean of LE 66).  The economic effects of these projects 
are quite strong: they raised the employment rate, and they increased farm income by almost half, 
presumably by lowering the cost of acquiring inputs and of delivering farm output to market.  Only in the 
case where SFD-only areas are compared with no-project areas do roads also raise non-farm income; in 
the other comparisons non-farm income fell, perhaps as a result of greater competition from outsiders as 
areas become more accessible, or possibly because the increased attractiveness of farming led some 
people to cut back on non-farm activities.  More surprisingly, there was no clear impact of the road 
projects on the poverty rate.  A plausible explanation is that opening up villages to the outside world may 
raise incomes on average, but expose some vulnerable members of society to new economic pressures.     
 
There is an interesting pattern that runs through Tables 9 to 13: as a general rule, SFD interventions have 
a stronger measurable effect when the comparison is between areas where there are SFD interventions 
alongside other projects (case C) and areas where there are only other projects (case E).  A reasonable Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 21 of 36 
interpretation is that the SFD has the strongest impact when its efforts complement other projects, rather 
than when it operates alone.  It is not entirely clear why this should be so, but it is possible that there are 
threshold effects at work: for instance, providing potable water to half a village may be helpful, but if the 
SFD then steps in and supplements such efforts, thereby ensuring everyone has potable water, it may be 
that only then are the effects on health appreciable. 
 
Table 13.  Summary of Effects of SFD Interventions in Road Maintenance and Improvement 
  SFD intervention vs. no SFD 
intervention [A vs. B] 
SFD intervention only vs. no 
intervention at all [D vs. F] 
SFD intervention with others vs. 
other interventions only [C vs. E] 





































































































































































Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.  † 
All coefficients shown here should be multiplied by 1,000.  All results are derived by first estimating a propensity score equation, 
and then confining the regression, nearest-neighbor matching, or kernel matching, to the region of common support. 





The SFD does not lend directly to households, but since 1991 it has spent LE 1,062 million to support 
microcredit, channeling both working capital and grants to financial intermediaries that in turn do provide 
microcredit.  SFD support for microcredit has gone to productive family associations  (33%), NGOs 
(31%), and the PBDAC (20%), as well as to village banks (9%), and occasionally to commercial banks 
(2%) or other lenders (5%).   
 
However, it is not possible to link individual loans with the activities of the SFD, so the approach that we 
take in this section is to estimate the impact of microcredit in general.  Our working assumption is that if 
microcredit  has an impact, then SFD support for microcredit has an impact.  This is not a trivial 
assumption; if SFD support for microlending simply displaces other support for microlending, then SFD Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 22 of 36 
interventions in this area might have no net effect.  Unfortunately, there is no way to determine whether 
this is the case. 
 
In the Egyptian context, microcredit consists of extending modest amounts of credit to individuals.  
Microloans may not exceed LE 5,000 (about US$900), and most are much smaller: 48% of the 
microloans made in 2005 were for no more than LE 1,000, and only 7% were for more than LE 3,000. 
 
The expectation is that such loans provide a way for households to generate income, and in the case of 
poor households, even rise out of poverty.  In 2005, 44% of those who took out microloans worked in 
agriculture, and a further 30% were traders.  Fully 55% of such loans went to women, and 42% of 
borrowers said they were illiterate.  On the other hand, most of the loans are short-term; in 2005, 70% of 
microloans had a duration of less than a year, and 22% were repayable over 1-2 years.  When asked (in 
the 2004/05 HIECS survey) whether microloans increased their income, 80% of households said yes, 
while the remaining 20% said no. 
 
Our analysis of the impact of microcredit is disaggregated to the level of five regions – metropolitan 
areas, urban and rural Lower Egypt, and urban and rural Upper Egypt.  This is done because of the belief 
that the effects of microcredit may vary substantially, depending on the underlying economic structure.  
We measure the impacts using propensity score matching; separate propensity score equations are 
estimated for each region, using household-level data – unlike our earlier estimates, which are based on 
village-level aggregates – and the models adapted until they were balanced.  We employ the propensity 
scores to match “treated” (i.e. borrower) individuals in the region of common support with comparators, 
using kernel matching, nearest-neighbor matching, and a regression model.  The results of the kernel 
matching are shown in Table 14, and in almost all cases were substantially the same as those found using 
the other two techniques; the two exceptions are noted in Table 14. 
 
One clear pattern does emerge from Table 14: microlending appears to lead to substantially higher levels 
of non-farm income per capita, especially in urban areas.  It is also associated with widespread self-
employment and, more modestly, with lower literacy rates. 
 
Most of the other effects are not consistent from one region to the next.  The sharpest distinction is 
between the metropolitan areas and urban Lower Egypt on the one hand, and the rest of the country on the 
other.  In the former, microcredit is associated with higher levels of expenditure, food expenditure, and Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 23 of 36 
income, and lower levels of poverty. Elsewhere, microcredit comes with lower expenditure and income 
per capita and higher poverty rates.   
 
 
Table 14.  Summary of the Effects of Microcredit 











icient  t-stat 
Coeff-
icient  t-stat 
Coeff-
icient  t-stat 
Coeff-
icient  t-stat 
Coeff-
icient  t-stat 
Farm income per capita  398.5  5.99  -61.8  1.82†  -141.4  -3.73  118.8  2.80  -257.1  -7.05 
Non-farm income per capita  896.9  4.70  573.9  4.44  113.5  2.93  604.5  5.02  121.9  3.79 
ln(expenditure per capita)  0.10  3.00  0.10  2.42  -0.01  -0.71  -0.25  -8.91  -0.14  -9.10 
ln(income per capita)  0.12  2.96  -0.03  -0.66  -0.04  -2.25  -0.21  -6.70  -0.11  -6.65 
ln(food expenditure per capita)  0.21  6.49  0.18  4.22  -0.01  -0.64  -0.11  -3.19†  -0.09  -5.34 
Food as share of expenditure  0.05  5.67  0.04  3.40  0.001  0.25  0.06  10.40  0.02  5.95 
Unemployment rate (in area)  0.03  1.85  0.01  0.33  0.04  5.67  -0.01  -0.93  0.01  1.92 
% in area working for a wage  1.97  0.85  12.07  2.95  18.08  11.35  -3.82  -1.36  20.36  15.36 
% in area self-employed  38.02  10.29  32.98  7.35  16.80  11.60  33.21  14.63  11.69  8.79 
Illiteracy rate (in area)  -0.03  -2.19  -0.04  -1.10  -0.08  -7.48  -0.02  -1.06  -0.09  -7.80 
Poverty gap rate (P1)  -0.59  -6.58  -0.76  -2.65  0.55  2.00  4.37  5.76  4.52  8.38 
Headcount poverty rate (P0)  -3.47  -4.24  -4.17  -2.29  3.15  2.34  16.75  6.55  16.99  8.93 
Memo items:                     
  # of households in sample  2961    2514    7772    2558    6675   
  Number of treatment cases  235    116    659    269    827   
  Region of common support:                     
    Lr bound propensity score  0.01    0.01    0.01    0.02    0.05   
    Upr bound propensity score  0.33    0.13    0.46    0.29    0.30   
Mean values of variables:                     
  Farm income per capita  55.37    124.09    735.54    120.99    709.71   
  Non-farm income per capita  955.29    887.50    354.76    722.19    245.28   
  ln(expenditure per capita)  8.15    7.87    7.68    7.80    7.43   
  ln(income per capita)  8.28    8.06    7.85    7.96    7.61   
  ln(food expend. per capita)  7.27    7.06    6.97    6.97    6.75   
  Food as share of expenditure  0.43    0.46    0.50    0.45    0.52   
  Unemployment rate (in area)  0.05    0.06    0.04    0.06    0.03   
  % in area working for a wage  76.15    61.07    45.46    62.81    41.45   
  % in area self-employed  20.92    31.02    40.37    31.57    42.79   
  Illiteracy rate (in area)  0.18    0.22    0.33    0.24    0.46   
  Poverty gap rate (P1)  0.59    1.22    1.65    3.26    6.88   
  Headcount poverty rate (P0)  4.36    7.32    11.94    16.30    34.19   
Notes:  Results shown here are based on propensity score matching using kernel matching.  Only treatment cases in the area of 
common support are matched.  † Nearest-neighbor matching and regression model do not find a statistically significant effect 
here. Coefficients highlighted in bright yellow are statistically significant at the 5% level or higher; those highlighted in pale 
yellow are statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
 
On explanation for this surprising result is that matching techniques work well when the variables in the 
propensity score equation capture, and hence control for, all the relevant factors that distinguish one Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 24 of 36 
borrower from another.  Inevitably, there are also unobservable influences that cannot be captured in 
survey data, and it is entirely possible that we have not been able to control satisfactorily for the fact that 
borrowers of microcredit have little education and are inherently poor, especially in the less-affluent 
regions of the country. 
 
Costs Compared with Benefits 
 
Even if a program has an impact, it may not be worth undertaking if it is too costly. The results of a first 
pass at measuring the cost effectiveness of SFD programs (except for microcredit) are shown in Table 15. 
The procedure that we followed involves measuring the total impacts of each program, using only the 
statistically significant coefficients from Tables 8-13, and dividing into the total cost. The numbers are in 
Egyptian pounds, and are for 2004. For instance, in order to measure the cost per one fewer illiterate 
person, using the regression method and comparing A vs. B, we divided the cost of the program (LE 
200m) by (-0.038 × population in A × adults as a share of the population). This gives a value of LE 1,842, 
which is the cost of pulling one person out of illiteracy, on the (not very reasonable) assumption that the 
eradication of illiteracy was the only goal of SFD educational spending.  
 
The available information on the cost of each program is approximate, and represents a raw total of 
spending from 1991 to 2007; in the absence of annual numbers it was not possible to inflate earlier figures 
to reflect inflation, or to cut off the spending totals in 2004, the year for which the household and 
community survey data are available. Nonetheless, the spending totals do reflect the correct orders of 
magnitude involved. 
 
As with the measures of the impacts themselves, the estimates of cost-effectiveness are not completely 
consistent. For instance, the provision of potable water or sanitation is associated with a reduction in 
poverty, at a cost (per one fewer poor) that averages somewhere between LE 24,684 (kernel estimates of 
A vs. B for sanitation) and LE 63,161 (regression estimates of A vs. B for potable water). Yet road 
schemes and literacy programs are associated with more poverty – either the econometric results are not 
adequately controlling for program placement, or roads and reading allow the less-poor to leave, reducing 
the poverty rate of those who remain – and the effects of health interventions on poverty are either 
positive or negative, depending on the comparison that one favors. 
 
The cost-effectiveness analysis, however interesting, is incomplete, because it does not try to balance 
benefits with costs, and it does not provide a mechanism for adding up the multiple benefits for any given Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 25 of 36 
program, such as roads, or sanitation.  The solution to undertake a cost-benefit analysis, which puts a 
monetary value on the benefits generated by the programs, and compares these values with the costs. 
 
Table 15.  Cost Effectiveness of Social Fund for Development Programs (in LE per outcome) 

















Education (LE 200m)                   
Per certificate obtained  909    1,000  1,866    1,555  1,667     
Per one less illiterate  1,842      3,682      5,385     
Per one more job              -9,723     
Per one fewer poor   -89,952  -2,508  -3,683             
Health (LE 390m)                   
Per one less U-5 death  183,176            196,170    184,762 
Per LE1 saved on health spending  13.1      33.7  37.8  26.5  21.8    24.8 
Per one fewer poor        15,594  9,814  12,568  -10,866  -8,241  -11,525 
Potable water (LE 620m)                   
Per LE1 saved on water  146.2  130.4  157.9  250.6    403.4  322.5  170.3  236.6 
Per one less U-5 death              551,786     
Per LE1 saved on health spending  14.6  9.4  16.2  33.2  43.8  41.8  27.0  18.4  25.8 
Per one fewer poor  63,161            40,458     
Sanitation (LE 220m)                   
Per person getting access to sanitation              24,399  5,741  9,946 
Per LE1 saved on sanitation spending  203.6            678.9    508.0 
Per person fewer with renal disease  -1,387      -374    -421  4,045    3,541 
Per person fewer with bilharzia            3,371       
Per one fewer poor  37,552    24,684        145,668    101,268 
Roads (LE 500m)                   
Per LE1 of transport spending saved  27.8  60.7  31.1        47.3  67.8  50.5 
Road utilization        0.002           
Per one more job  59,903    54,457        87,674    93,519 
Per LE1 of additional farm income  12.9  12.1  17.2  17.3    16.6  35.4     
Per LE1 of additional non-farm inc  -36    -32  28      -41  -43  -38 
Per one fewer poor        -95,188           
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
 
There are two challenges in undertaking the cost-benefit analysis: first, one has to measure the total 
impact of the programs, which we have done above; and second, it is necessary to value each output. For 
the latter, we drew on secondary sources, using the values that are set out in Table 16. We suppose that 
the benefit of pulling someone out of illiteracy is the avoided cost of schooling per child that completes 
fifth grade. This treats literacy as a right that needs to be provided, rather than valuing it solely in terms of 
labor market outcomes. We value an additional job by measuring the economic rent that accrues when 
someone who  was not working now has full-time employment. This may be measured as the wage Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 26 of 36 
actually received minus the opportunity cost of supplying that labor (see Boardman et al. 2006, chapter 
11).  To measure the wage appropriate to the type of jobs that SFD interventions are likely to help create, 
we used the private sector monthly wages received by those with an elementary school education or less 
in 2004 (Said 2007, Table A2), adjusted to the prices of 2004; in the absence of further information, we 
assume that the labor rent constitutes half of this total, and we also assume that the jobs created last for, 
on average, five years. This gives a total value per job created of LE 10,700 (in 2004). This is 
substantially less than the “cost of creating a job,” which Ghoneim (2006) puts at LE 40,000 in the 
relatively labor-intensive garment sector and MEMRI (2002) pegs at LE 50,000 in agriculture. 
 
Some SFD programs reduce poverty. One way to put a value on this is to measure the increase in 
expenditure that would be required to raise a poor person, whose expenditure is at the mean level for the 
poor, out of poverty. The World Bank (2007) shows that the annual poverty deficit per poor person is LE 
266 per year, or LE 1,333 over a period of five years, which we take to be the effective life of an SFD 
poverty-reducing intervention. 
 
Table 16: Benefits per unit of output produced by SFD projects 
Impact to be valued  LE  Comments and Sources 
Per one less illiterate  1,157  The benefit is that we save the cost of educating a child to the fifth grade. The cost 
per fifth-grade completer was LE 911 in 1998-99 (USAID 2006, based on Zaalouk 
2006); this was grossed up by 27% to reflect consumer price inflation between 
1998-99 and 2004 (World Bank, World Development Indicators, online, accessed 
March 7, 2009). 
Per one more job  10,700  Measures the economic rent obtained by working; assumed to be half of the wage 
earned in private sector employment by those with an elementary school education 
or less in 2006 (adjusted to the prices of 2004); the wage data come from Said 
(2007). 
Per one fewer poor  1,333  The poverty line is LE 1,423 per person per year. Using this line, a poverty rate of 
19.6%, and data on income distribution in 2004 from PovcalNet, we fitted a 
quadratic approximation to the Lorenz curve (see Datt 1998) and estimated the 
average expenditure of the poor to be LE 1,175. We assume that when someone is 
brought out of poverty, their spending rises from LE 1,175 to LE 1,423 (i.e. by LE 
248), and maintains this improvement for five years. 
Per one less U-5 death  796,000  Boardman et al. (2006, chapter 15) conclude that a value of US$4 m ± USD$2 m, 
in 2002 prices, is appropriate for the US; Viscusi and Aldy (2003) in their meta-
analysis use a value of US$6.7m (in 2000 prices). We assume that the value of a 
statistical life in Egypt is the same multiple of GDP/capita as in the US. 
Per LE1 saved on medicines (or water, 
or sanitation, or health, or transport) 
5  When a project saves LE 1 in spending, we assume that this lasts for five years. 
Per person less with renal disease  75,222  The Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) of nephritis is 0.091 and of nephrosis is 
0.098, which means that one less case of renal disease saves the equivalent of 
0.0945 of the value of a life (Mathers et al. 2001). 
Per person less with bilharzia  4,776  The Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) of a bilharzia infection is 0.006, which 
means it is equivalent to 0.006 of the value of a life (Mathers et al. 2001). 
Per LE1 of additional farm income, or 
additional non-farm income 
5  We assume that this effect lasts for five years. 
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Where SFD interventions reduce mortality, it is necessary to use a value of a statistical life. To the best of 
our knowledge, this has not been estimated in the context of Egypt. Based on their review of studies 
undertaken in the United States, Boardman et al. (2006) believe that in the United States a statistical life 
may be valued at US$4m ± 2m. We adjust this number to reflect the lower levels of income in Egypt than 
in the United States, giving a value of LE 796,000 in 2004 prices.  Sanitation projects also reduce the 
incidence of disease, and these too need to be valued. One approach is to estimate the Disability-Adjusted 
Life Years (DALYs); for each medical condition, the DALY measures the estimated reduction in life 
expectancy plus a measure of the handicap faced by sufferers. For an incident of bilharzia, the DALY is 
0.006 (Mathers et al. 2001), which means that each case of bilharzia that is avoided leads to a saving 
equivalent to 0.006 of the value of a life. The DALY for renal disease is 0.0945. 
 
 
The combined impact of these effects is shown in Table 17.  Consider, for example, the regression 
estimates of the effects of SFD road projects, comparing areas with SFD projects (A) with areas that do 
not have SFD projects (B). The total benefit of these projects come from savings in transport costs (LE 
90m), job creation (LE 334m), higher farm income (LE 193m), adjusted for lower non-farm income (-LE 
70m), for a net total benefit of LE 548 m. This exceeds the cost of the road projects (LE 500m), indicating 
that these projects appear to be economically worthwhile. Since some of these results are sensitive to the 
valuation of a statistical life, we also report the totals under the assumption that a statistical life has one-
fifth of the valuation discussed above. 
 
The most consistent results are for SFD road projects, where the measured benefits are generally positive, 
and in the case of the A vs. B comparison, are arguably higher than the costs. The net benefits are not as 
large in the D vs. F and C vs. E comparisons, where they typically do not exceed half of the cost of the 
program.  For SFD potable water projects, the benefits are also generally positive, but in only one case 
(the regression estimate based on C vs. E, assuming a high value of a statistical life) do the benefits 
exceed the cost. The SFD health projects generate modest benefits in raising people out of poverty and 
reducing private spending on health care, but by some of the econometric measures they lower child 
mortality. If the value that we use for a statistical life is appropriate, then the main benefit of these health 
projects occurs by reducing child deaths. 
 
The benefits of the education projects are rather modest, relative to the cost; and the effects of the 
sanitation projects cannot be determined with much reliability; they are driven by the effects on renal 
disease, which in turn are highly sensitive to the value put on a statistical life; in this case some of the Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 28 of 36 
econometric estimates have an unexpected sign, implying, if taken at face value, that some of the projects 
may have made some health outcomes worse. 
 
 
Table 17.  Cost-Benefit Analysis of Social Fund for Development Programs 

















Education (LE 200m)                   
Per one less illiterate (LE 1,157)  126      63      43     
Per one more job (LE 10,700)              -220     
Per one fewer poor  (LE 248/yr × 5)  -3  -106  -72             
Total  123  -106  -72  63      -177     
Total, with lower value of life  123  -106  -72  63      -177     
Health (LE 390m)                   
Per one less U-5 death (LE 0.796m)  1,695            1,583    1,680 
Per LE1 saved on health spending (× 5)  149      58  52  74  89    79 
Per one fewer poor  (LE 248/yr × 5)        33  53  41  -48  -63  -45 
Total  1,844      91  104  115  1,624  -63  1,714 
Total, with lower value of life  319      91  104  115  200  -63  202 
Potable water (LE 620m)                   
Per LE1 saved on water (× 5)  21  24  20  12    8  10  18  13 
Per one less U-5 death (LE 0.796m)              894     
Per LE1 saved on health spending (× 5)  212  330  191  93  71  74  115  168  120 
Per one fewer poor  (LE 248/yr × 5)  13            20     
Total  247  354  211  106  71  82  1,039  186  133 
Total, with lower value of life  247  354  211  106  71  82  234  186  133 
Sanitation (LE 220m)                   
Per LE1 saved on sanitation spending (× 5)  5            2    2 
Per person fewer with renal disease 
(0.0945 × life)  -11,928      -44,269    -39,271  4,091    4,674 
Per person fewer with bilharzia (0.006 × 
life)            312       
Per one fewer poor  (LE 248/yr × 5)  8    12        2    3 
Total  -11.915    12  -44,269    -38,960  4,094    4.679 
Total, with lower value of life  -1,180    12  -4,427    -3,896  413    472 
Roads (LE 500m)                   
Per LE1 of transport spending saved (× 5)  90  41  80        53  37  50 
Per one more job (LE 10,700)  334    367        228    214 
Per LE1 of additional farm income (× 5)  193  207  145  144    151  71     
Per LE1 of additional non-farm inc (× 5)  -70    -79  90      -61  -59  -66 
Per one fewer poor  (LE 248/yr × 5)        -7           
Total  548  248  514  227    151  291  -22  198 
Total, with lower value of life  548  248  514  227    151  291  -22  198 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
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This cost-benefit exercise rests on fairly strong assumptions, and so is somewhat tenuous; better 
measurement might help alleviate some of the problems. However, even these rudimentary numbers are 
useful enough to help concentrate minds for the future: the SFD education and sanitation projects do not 
look compelling, and even the other projects (health, potable water, and roads) have benefits that do not 
generally exceed the costs. There are certainly other worthwhile justifications for SFD projects – equity, 
the satisfaction of human rights, political imperatives – but on strictly economic terms none of them look 




Even when the costs of a program exceed its benefits, the program might be justifiable on distributional 
grounds; for example, although minimum wage laws are inefficient, they may be one of the more 
effective ways of channeling resources to the poor (Gramlich 1997). This naturally leads us to ask 
whether the SFD programs were successful in targeting the poor. During the first phase of its work (1992-
1996) the SFD functioned primarily as an emergency fund and safety net to support implementation of the 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), and it sought to target its assistance 
geographically based on poverty and unemployment rates at the level of the 27 governorates, broken 
down where possible into urban and rural divisions.3
If SFD spending were distributed to governorates strictly in proportion to population, then it would follow 
the diagonal in Figure 3. This is close to being the case for microcredit projects (Figure 3, bottom panel). 
 The SFD has since transitioned into a permanent 
development organization with the twin goals of supporting and developing micro- and small enterprises, 
and enhancing human capital for the poor, and so retains its original focus on combating poverty. A 
poverty-targeting unit has now been established within the SFD to help it identify more clearly those 
areas of the country where interventions are likely to have the greatest impact on the poor. 
 
The first question to ask is how effectively the SFD has targeted its spending at the governorate level. 
Given its stated commitment to targeting the poor, one might expect SFD spending to go 
disproportionately to governorates with a higher level of poverty.  We measure this visually in Figure 3: 
the horizontal axis shows the cumulative percentage of the population, obtained by sorting governorates 
from those with the highest to those with the lowest level of poverty. The vertical axis shows cumulative 
percentages; the smooth regular curve tracks the incidence of poverty and shows, for instance, that 80% 
of the poor in Egypt live in the poorest half of the governorates (as measured by population). 
 
                                                 
3 As of 2004 there were 27 governorates; two more (Helwan, and 6
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On the other hand, spending on health projects comes close to tracking the number of poor people by 
governorate, at least in the governorates with the highest incidence of poverty. It is clear from Figure 3 
that despite SFD claims that its programs are allocated largely based on the incidence of poverty at the 
governorate level, all of them fall short of allocating spending (at the governorate level) in proportion to 
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Figure 3. The incidence of poverty, and of SFD spending, at the governorate level 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
Even if SFD programs are not allocated to governorates in proportion to poverty, they could be well 
targeted to the poor at the village or ward level – for instance, by going disproportionately to poor 
villages, even in rich governorates. With the exception of microcredit, we do not have household-level Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 31 of 36 
information on the targeting of SFD programs, but we do have information from the HIECS 2004/2005 at 
the village level, and so can determine whether SFD spending is directed mainly towards poor villages 
(even if this is no guarantee that the poor, rather than the non-poor, are the ultimate beneficiaries).  Figure 
4 displays the relevant information; it shows the cumulative percentage of the population from the poorest 
to the richest villages and wards on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis shows the cumulative 
percentage of SFD spending on the various programs; for each program there is a different “concentration 
curves”. Although it is not strictly comparable, since it is based on household-level data, Figure 4 also 
shows a Lorenz curve – the heavy line to the lower right – which tracks the distribution of per capita 
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Figure 4. Distribution of Spending on SFD Programs, Based on Village/Ward-Level Data, 2004-05. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 32 of 36 
The thin diagonal in Figure 4 shows the line of “perfect equality” and serves as a useful reference. For 
two of the SFD programs – education, and waste water – the cumulative percentage of spending is below 
the line of perfect equality. This means, for instance, that the poorest 20% of villages (by population) 
receive less than 20% of SFD spending on education, or on waste water treatment. Spending on these 
programs thus favors the better-off over the poor.4
(a)  Access to drinking water on the property; 
 
 
All the other SFD programs have concentration curves above the line of perfect equality, meaning that 
spending is geared more towards the poor than the rich (at the village level).  Spending on potable water 
projects, and to a lesser extent on road and health interventions, is relatively strongly geared toward 
poorer villages. While these effects are clear, they are not overwhelming; the poorest 30% of the 
population lives in villages that received 43% of SFD potable water spending, and 35% of SFD health 
and road spending. These reflect a pro-poor bias, but not a strong one.  
 
Table 18 provides some further information on SFD targeting. For each SFD program, it shows the 
headcount poverty rate in villages with, and without, an SFD intervention. For instance, the poverty rate 
in villages and wards with SFD road projects was 21.8%, compared to 19.5% in areas without an SFD 
road project, a difference that is statistically significant (t=-5.03); the national poverty rate in 2004-05 was 
19.6%.  The numbers confirm that SFD education and wastewater treatment projects were not well 
targeted to villages with higher poverty rates, while road, health, and (especially) potable water projects 
were more successfully targeted to the poor.  The poverty rate in villages and wards that received any 
SFD intervention was 21.6%, which is significantly higher than the 18.6% poverty rate in areas with no 
SFD project. 
 
The numbers in Table 18 allow us to check the robustness of these findings. Let us suppose that there are 
six basic needs, as follows: 
(b)  Having a toilet other than a simple pit latrine; 
(c)  Primary-age children are enrolled in school; 
(d)  The household head has at least three years of education and is employed; or at least one in 
every three household members is employed; 
(e)  There are no more than three persons per room (excluding bathrooms); and 
                                                 
4 Public spending is “regressive” if it represents a smaller percentage of household income (or spending) for the 
poor than for the rich; this would be reflected in a concentration curve below the Lorenz curve, which is not the case 
even for SFD spending on education or waste water treatment.  Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 33 of 36 
(f)  The dwelling is not improvised, and the walls are made of brick (or better). 
Based on the HIECS 2004/2005 data, 6.2% of the Egyptian population met all of these basic needs, while 
14.2% had three or more unmet basic needs.  Defining the poor as those with at least three unmet basic 
needs, we see that only SFD health and potable water projects were targeted to villages with 
disproportionately high levels of this type of poverty. 
 
Table 18.  Poverty Rates in Areas Served by SFD Projects 
  Headcount poverty rate (%)  t-statistic for 
difference in 
poverty rates 
% of households with at least 3 
unmet basic needs 








Education  19.8  15.0  14.2  14.5  10.1 
Wastewater treatment  19.6  12.8  9.9  14.2  13.2 
Environment  19.5  20.1  -1.7  14.2  13.8 
Roads  19.5  21.8  -5.0  14.3  13.2 
Health  19.5  22.1  -6.0  14.2  14.7 
Microcredit  18.8  23.1  -18.1  14.1  14.9 
Potable water  18.2  30.2  -38.6  13.5  19.5 
Microcredit*    45.6       
Any intervention  18.6  21.6  -15.6  14.2  14.3 
Note: * Based on household-level data. All other figures are based on village/ward-level data from HIECS 2004/2005. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
These numbers likely understate the extent to which SFD programs reach poor households if, as is 
plausible (although not certain), the actual beneficiaries of SFD programs in a  given village are 
disproportionately poor. In the case of microcredit it is possible to identify the households that avail of the 
credit, using the HIECS 2005/2005 household data. The relevant numbers are set out in Table 19, and 
they show that the poorest 10% of the population account for 24.9% of all microcredit loans; furthermore, 
the headcount poverty rate among microcredit users was 45.6%, or far above the national rate of 19.6% 
(in 2004-05). Without further information on the size of loans, we cannot tell what proportion of the value 
of microcredit goes to the poorest households, but the indications are that microcredit is very highly 
targeted to the poor. However, it must be noted that these numbers refer to all microcredit, and not 
specifically to SFD-supported microcredit, which individuals cannot identify separately, mainly because 




In our examination of the Egyptian Social Fund for Development, we have focused on three key 
questions: How large is the impact of the SFD interventions? Have the benefits been commensurate with 
the costs? And have the programs been targeted successfully to the poor? Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development  Version of June 29, 2009  Page 34 of 36 
 
Table 19.  Percentage of direct beneficiaries of microcredit lending, by decile, 2004-05. 
  Urban Areas  Rural Areas  All Egypt 
Deciles       
Poorest   23.8  25.2  24.9 
2  9.9  18.1  16.2 
3  8.9  15.6  14.1 
4  7.8  11.8  10.8 
5  6.1  9.1  8.4 
6  7.8  6.5  6.8 
7  11.3  5.8  7.1 
8  8.0  3.7  4.7 
9  8.9  3.0  4.4 
Richest  7.7  1.3  2.8 
Memo:        
 Poverty rate, beneficiaries  33.1  49.4  45.6 
 Poverty rate, population  10.1  26.8  19.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005. 
 
 
We have sought to measure the impact of six separate SFD programs; in every case there are several 
measurable outcomes, each estimated in at least three distinct ways for three types of comparisons.  This 
gives well over 200 measures of impact.  Inevitably, with such a large body of estimates, some of the 
results do not appear to be entirely consistent, and a few are either surprising or implausible.  That said, 
the general thrust of the estimates is that SFD programs have had clear and measurable effects, in the 
expected direction, for all of the programs considered here.  
 
Educational interventions have reduced illiteracy, but have had no clear effect on employment; health 
programs have brought down household spending on health by almost a fifth, and markedly reduced 
under-5 mortality; potable water provision has lowered household spending both on water and health, and 
has also reduced under-5 mortality; sanitation interventions have cut household spending on sanitation 
and lowered poverty; and road projects are associated with a 20 percent drop in household transportation 
costs, and a higher employment rate. As a general rule, SFD interventions have had the strongest 
identifiable impact when they have complemented other projects, rather than operating alone. 
 
The SFD supports microcredit, but does not lend directly to households. Our analysis of the impact of 
microlending in general finds that it is associated with higher levels of non-farm income per capita. In the 
metropolitan areas and in urban Upper Egypt, microcredit goes together with higher household 
expenditures and less poverty, although this association is not evident elsewhere. 
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The SFD has a mandate to reduce poverty, increase employment opportunities, and encourage small-
enterprise development. This focus on the social dimension means that the SFD has not traditionally 
needed to trade off costs with economic benefits, and so it cannot be judged by this measure. An 
economic cost-benefit analysis does have a role, however, if only in identifying the most easily-justifiable 
SFD activities. 
 
We find that SFD road projects generate benefits that, by some estimates, exceed the costs. This is also 
true of health and potable water interventions, at least if the value put on a statistical life is not too low. 
The strictly economic benefits of educational projects are more modest relative to the costs; and the 
benefits from sanitation projects are highly sensitive to the econometric measures used to quantify their 
impact, and so the measures are unreliable.  It should be emphasized that the valuation of unit benefits is 
based on secondary sources, and so requires strong assumptions that are difficulty to verify 
independently. 
 
Even where SFD interventions may not pass a cost-benefit test, they may well be justified on other 
grounds – as an efficient way to achieve social equity or to further human rights, or to satisfy political 
needs. With the exception of microcredit, it is not possible to associate program benefits with individual 
households, so in most cases we have only been able to measure the effectiveness with which the SFD has 
targeted its interventions to poor areas, whether poor governorates, or poor villages/wards.   
 
The SFD interventions that we have analyzed go to areas that have a higher headcount poverty rate than 
the national average (21.6% vs. 19.6%), and a lower level of average per capita annual household 
expenditure (LE 2,292 vs. LE 2,556). In this broad sense, SFD interventions are pro-poor, although at 
first sight only modestly so. A household-level analysis of targeting was only possible for microcredit, 
and in this case the poverty rate among borrowers was 45.6%, or more than twice the national average. 
Projects related to roads, health, and (especially) potable water were also targeted to poor areas, but 
spending on education and on wastewater treatment went disproportionately to areas with lower-than-
average village-level poverty rates.  If, within these villages, the beneficiaries were generally poor, then 
even these interventions may have been pro-poor.  
 
There is unfinished business. The data were not sufficiently rich to allow us to do a complete cost-benefit 
analysis of the SFD microcredit programs, or of the impact, costs, or benefits of the largest single SFD 
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